'I'HE CIA AND I

rs

1

PROPRIEI'AHY NE'l'WORXS

An understanding of the role of the CIA and of its numerous
proprietary companies can not be obtained from/' a simple
study of those proprietaries alone.

I

i:t'he CJ A' s proprte-

taries are deeply involved with the Department of Defense.
They are involved with other departments of the Government
and they are involved with many other governments.
In some cases the relationship is very complex.

The CIA

may have a military unit which is a cover unit and that
unit may deal with a proprietary which in tyrn will deal
with some legitimate company.
will think

~hat

The legitimate compa.riy

it is dealing with a private firm or with

the DOD directly where a military contract is involved ••

In another case a CIA proprietary may gain a contract from
the DOD and will utilize that contract to service the military and at the same trime to service other companies.

In

so doing the private companies will not :k..now that they are
' deaflj_ng with the CIA and not the DOD.
In another case a · CIA proprietary may use its CIA conJ1.ec ti on
to get something from the DOD which other companies could
not get, thereby gaining a competitive advantage over the
othebs.

In so doing this device may be used-intentionally

or unintentionally-to destroy the competition.
And then in certain re.re co.ses, but i n some most importaI1t
cases, an. outsicie company may le::>nn that it has been outbid
by a proprietary.

:Lt may learn thtS through its own de•
vices a..-rid contacts or i -c r;;ay acq:.: ~.i'."e such knowledge from
a lawyer who has had special knowlecige of such activity.
In that case it may inform the DOD that if it does not get
an equal or better contract it will blow the whistle.
This t;ype of "National Security" blackmail is most effective.
The outside company will get a contract aI1d then may
tinue to use that kind of blackmail year after year.
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prietaries' activities a re concealed deeply within major
companies, which cover for the CIA and in return get favors and
inside assistance.
study.

This could well be the subject of a

co~plete

Even beyond the search into proprietaries the study could

look at what the CIA does with the rather large sums of money
{

which it earns from these p r oprietaries.

The CIA uses a

11

street!!

name and buys and sells as other big investors do to manage these
vast funds.
CIA is
Firnds

11

The street name most commonly associated with the

Suydam 11

•

Funds of this nature are of cou.rse not Federal

and are not subject to the usual controls.

from the sale of proprietaries.

Huge sums arise

We do not know where they go,

nor do we know if the sale means a bona fide separa:tion from the
CIA or just another cover arrangement.
of these fi.mds for

11

The CIA depends upon some

1Au.._Tldered 11 money.

Few people have ever had a real opportunity to understand
how the CIA utilizes money.

'I'he CIA .gets "what money will buy 11

many times without the actual expenditure of fi.mds.

It makes

liberal use of the provisions of the National Economy Ac.t of

1932 as amended in order to acquire goods and services from other
ag encies at no . cost or at nominal cost.

The "horizontal" move-

ment of money where the CIA is involved is a little J.01own
specialty.
In order to provide some b2ckgr·ound for all of this it may
be well worth while to provide _ some background about the DOD/CIA
relationship and its role within the government, industry and
foreign affairs.
Before 1955 the U.S.Air Force had a policy for providing
su~port

of the clandestine activities of the CIA; but it was re-

latively informal.

It was based upon a letter: coded DAF

53.

In August of 1955 I was directed by the Director of Plans, .Hq
USAF to assemble all pertinent files and records and to draft a
formal set of policy papers for the special support of the clandestine activity of the CIA.

I had participated in clandestine

!'

'.

certain activ iti es in Saudi Arabia , Russia , Turke y and had been
;,

at the Cairo a nd Teheran Confer ences .

During the Korean Wa.r

period I was the Com.ma,."'1der of a n Air Tran sp ort unit which was
responsible for certain

operation~

throu ghout South Asia among

them providing support for the CIA in India, Thailand, Vietnam,
the Philippines and Okinawa.
work before

I had background for

.•

th~s

.
special

1955.

I was able to assemble a rath er uoluminous file dating
from

1946

and

1947

through

1955.

Some of these papers were in

the handwriting of General Vandenberg who had b een Chief of Staff
of the Air Force and who had been the Director of the Central Intellig e nce Group before the creation of the CIA.

Other papers

were the original NSCID's d a ting back to the forties and by far
the most important papers were the Report to President Truman on
the CIA, dated Jan

1,1949,

Jackson and Viathias Correa.

made by Allen W. Dulles, William H.
I. . ater directives were s ome ~1e

handwriting of President :C:isen....°flower.
One of the most pertinent of these papers was a long
letter directive signed by the then Secretary of Defense Louis
Jo'hnson, in

1949

which established D@D policy for the operational

and logistics · s ·•.J pJ) o:ct of uhe clct!1destine ac ti vi ty of the CIP..
(l~OTE:

This use of words is to differ e ntiate the cla.11destine

s

op erat ions of the CIA from its Intelligence mision
which was
,.
not given this special status.)

The principle point of the

Johnson directive was t he DOD would d o everything po ss i ble to
support the CIA but only after it has b een

asc~rtained

without

doubt that approval for eac h project had been 9 ranted by the NSC
a..~d

then only after ' the CIA had agree d to reimburse the DOD for

all o'...lt-of-pocket costs incident to such support.

It also auth-

ori zed elaborate personnel support of the CIA on an assigned and
attached basis.
l~ational

policy required that no clandestine operati cn

would ever be undertaken which could l/ot be plausibly disclaimed
by the U.S.government in the .event of faiflure or compromise. As
a result all cl andestine operations were de s igne d to be small,

4

very clo s ely h e ld and when e v e r pa s sibl e ,one -ti me.
Needless to s ay, alth ou g h my visible role was to p r ovide
y'lili tary support for the cla..'1destine operations of the CIA, my
:c eal role was to keep the military inf or1n e d of what was being
done in this rarified atmosphere, its cost and to emphasize this
requirement for the ability to plausibly disclaim any operation
which involved military support----at all times.
With all of this material and with the assistance of
selected officials I was able to prepare a draft for support
activities which was ready for Air Staff coordiBntion.

The

report was about 50-60 pages in length and was coded:TAB-6.

It

was coordinated throughout the Air Force in the States and overseas and in addition to each Commanding General one other officer
was designate to handle

""2~S

11

TAB-6 11 matters.

General Thomas D. 'vlhite

Chieftof Staff of the USAF at that time and my boss was

Gen Richard Lindsay.
When the Air Force policy had been made official, it was
'
arranged
for me to meet with Allen Dulles and his Deputy> General

C.P.Cabell.

They arranged for me to have a very thorough and

continuing briefing on all CIA matters involved.

The CIA was

pl e ased with this policy a.nd Vir Dulles suggested that there be
a single

11

Focal Point 11 office on the Air Staff.

This was my .

office and I was its chief from 1955 throu gh 1 9 60.
In 19 .56 Allen Dulles arranged for me to travel around the
world to visit a consid e r a bl,e number of his ove rseas offices in
the company of one of his officials.

Tbis was my first official

visit to a number of these places and I went back to many of them
during the next eight years.
In 1960, at the request of the Secretary of Defense, Thomas
Gates I was

t~ansf erred

ial Operations.

from the Air Force to the Office of Spec-

This senior office was responsible for all

contact between the CIA and DOD, among other things.

At that

level I performed much the same duties and functions there as I
had done in the Air Force only then it was for all services.

I

After the Kennedy inauguration I continued to work in the office
of the Secretary of Defense, Bob McNamara for about a ye ar !Antil
Gen eral Earle Wheeler, who was then the Director of the Joint
Staff suggested th a t the military support of the CIA might best
be placed on the Joint Staff level.

This request was granted and

in 1962 I was transferred to the Joint Staff and provided with
a Navy and Army counterpart along with secretarial assistance.
My first duty there was to draw up a Joint Staff policy
paper very much like the one which I had created for the Air
jForce.

This was done and it was approved by the Chiefs of Staff

.!

II c21d

officially

11

Red Striped'".

An office similar to mine in the

Jci~t Staff waps established in most major commands overseas and
in t;he Army, Navy and Air Force.
In the nine years which this period spanned many of the
th:ing s which have now become quite well known as "CIA activi ties'j
meaI1ing clandestine operatio,n s rather than intelligence chores,
took place.

For example, the very first meeting which I attended

with CIA officials in 1955 involved the origins of the vast P2V-7
program which became a world wide ELINT, radar and surveillance
'
project.

' 1

The Indonesian project, Tibetan programs, the Bay of

Figs program and many other-s all - got their first . military support
from my office.

Gradually a system developed which resulted in

the DOD being--in effect--a proprietary partner of the CIA.
l"Jy office processed and supported the assignment or attachment of thm1saT1ds of mili tary personn.el to the agency and in
support of the agency.

It established and supported more than

one thousand military cover units which were created for the sole
purpose of providing cover for the ClA.
This became a :particularly impoitant ac.$ivity.

For example

private com:r::anies which did business with these "military" units
thougbt the.}' 1-.:ere dealing with the military when in reality they
were dealing with the CIA.

In some cases this led to major con-

tracts and in certain cases these contracts were let without the
custorr.ary and required bidding or amending procedures normal to
the DOD system.

Of course, in keeping with the old directive pro-

mulgated by Sec Johnson and up-dated thereafter, the military

t:

6

sought reimbursement for all funds expended.

But in some cases

due t o security precautions they did not know what had taken
place and in others they could not take action with out exposing the CIA.

Some competitive, non-proprietary companies

learned about this system and took advantage of it.
this quiet undercover relationship for leverage.

They used

As small com-

panies learned this, larger ones did and this got to be quite
widespread and led to a most unique method of procurement.
In another twist of this process the CIA would put its
own agents into "military" units and in some cases would have
them recalled to active duty so that they could serve in uniform
with rank.

Then the CIA would ask the Defense Dept to reassign

these people to other jobs with other federa l departments and
agenc-i:e s or even out into industry.

Obviously the gaining org-

anization did not know that the DOD was serving as a proprietary
of the CIA.

rhis led to many complicated situations especially

1

,.

when a CIA agent, wearing the uniform of the armed forces was
giyen a responsible job in the

FP~~ o~

other such policy making

organization.
This got even more deep-rooted after the original "deep
co\ter' 1 assignee was replaced and another took -his place. - By that
time no one would know that the original

11

slot' had been created

for the CIA and the new incumbent would be completely unidentifiable to anyone as a CIA agent.
This required elaborate money arrang err:._ents which my office
was responsible for arranging.

The salary such persons drew from

tbe military would be bl anked and the man would turn in his
military check.

Re would be paid by the CIA and the military

would be reimbursed--on paper to keep the record clear.

Then it

became more complicated when the individual would travel on
~ifitary

orders and incur expenses against the DOD all over the

world.
In maay cases we would keep three files: the individual's,
his CIA file and his military file.
~~~~~~~·'·-~~
0hem

We would do our best to keep

all up to date and to plug the holes.

With all this activity it was inevitable that my office
would become increasingly involved in the CIA proprietary program.

We handled hundreds of cont,J"acts with companies of all

kinds, with aircraft companies, with air lines, with maintenance
organizations, with brokers and universities, with sub-contractors

II

and with innumerable small deals of every kind.

Out of all this

j came the "Air America" enterprises. (Air America will be used
here generically.

Actually there is a whole hierarchy of

companies under the Pacific Corp and other arrangements.)
Air America is not unknown; yet there are perhaps no more
than two or three people who really ]r,_r10w how extensive what we
shall call "Air America"is and how far reaching its activity.
At one time we had records in my office, and I am sure they were
not comprehensive, of more than 100 organizations which were in
some way or other related to Air America.

It may be said that

Air America, in total war one of the largest airlines a.Dd air
support , organizations in the world.
7

At one time Air America had

0

~ base fac~lities in the Far East which had more than 4,000 men
on each one.

· ~an

any other airline say that?

There are Air America affiliates all over the world.
America works in Europe, the Far East and the Middle East.

Air
Air

America crews and aircraft played a significant role in the Bay
of Pigs program and in such things as the Indonesian a..'1d Tibetan
proj.ects.
Air Arr.erica had the capability to rr: aintain aircraft of
all kinds and more than that ' it could make aircraft parts for
most of its own aircraft.

It had the design drawings required

to make all parts of such aircraft as DC-6's.

It could build

complete aircraft in order that it could create a totally saniti zed airplane with no serial numbers, an;y--where in its entire

structure---not just the tail number, for operational purposes.
L

Air America was an elaborate corporation.
in the world.

The best in its busines

It would surprise this committee to have a listing

8

.,

of how Air America acquired all of its aircraft and then for this
~

committee to be able to go over that "sanitized" list to find out

I

Il

how Air America actually obtained its aircraft and its other
as sc~ s.

capital

It is significant to point out that these

f

t

!

advantages which accrued to Air America gave it an enviable competitive adge in the airline, air maintenance and even in the

!
t
1r

I

manufacturing and sub-component business among its peers.

I

t

There came a time when the Pacific Corporation, Air
r

America's gilt-edged parent, was being formed that the CIA wanted
to regularize and formalize many of its activities.
things they were

gre~tly

One of the

interested in was the process of bidding

for military contracts both airlift and maintenance.

The presi-

t

'

t

,.
t

!

dent of Air America and I worked together for quite a period of
time on the draft of an important letter which was to be signed
by Allen Dulles and addressed to the Secretary of the Air Force

,.

f

with . the suggestion that P!ir America be informed of every request
for bid for either airlift or air maintenance c ontracts and that

I

Air America be carefully considered when such bids were being

f

awarded.

l

We were careful, on both sides, to see that the letter

was not a firm commitment and the Air Force was careful to see

preparation the letter was signed by Allen
Dulles and delivered to the Secretary via the office of the Deputy J: ssi st2nt Sec::::· e tary for Civil Aviation. (It should be

r~oted

that the office of that official was Pente.gon Room number 4E871
and that the office of the Secretary of the Air Force is also
No other such official had the same room

number as the Secretary.

Actually that room is the office of

the Secretary's receptionist as was physically across the hall
from the Se c retary.

It also happened that the incumbent of

that office \\·as an official of the CIA.)
Because I had worked on the

develo p~ent

f

tf

that no explicit commitment was inferred.

listed as 4E871.

i

of this letter I

wa s directed to prepare a reply for the Secretary's signature.
In general the Sec*etary agreed with the suggestion ~rom Allen

i
l
'

Cl!l

s 1_1 c h contracts.

1ncn;v

i

at a

~ime

Air Jrne;r·ica ;_rnd other proprietaries re:cieve:d

:iporta.nt 2irlift c:_nd aircraft maintenance contracts eve n
when this meant omitting other small carriers from

contracts which they might otherwise have expected to win.
WiLh the fulfillment of th es e contracts the CIA
"l~se

~as

able to make

of such flights for its ov:n operational purposes and more

importantly to give the appearance that Air America was a healthy
and normal hard working airline among its competition.

In the Far East t!1is close

::.~elationship blossome~to

the period of the Vietn am War V.'hen Air _l,merica and its numberless affiliates received tremendous contracts i!lvoltlng them in
all aspects of the war .

But it was not always tha t \·.' ay 2nd on

one conspicuo"lJS occasion our letter of agreement with Allen Dulles
caused the hir Force sooe grief .

During that particRlar period

airlift contracts had reached a low ebb

up for bid in the Far Eas~.
i

:s bid.

81d

few

there were very

In spi te of thi s hi r A~erica won

This caused some bitter complaints f:r:·om the others.

One in particuleir came to the Pentagon and requested a discussion

with the Secretary.
~as

Failing success with that ploy the next step

to visit the law offices of a prominent firm acros s
I\ot long af ter that they both retD.rned and some sort of

~i-..;er .

?.STE:S'.:::er1t

for so=e

1·<as reached .
2i~~ift .

The " :rw::-win.ner" obt2ined a contrc.ct
E UCCSSS

did :riot go

-.

'

G.l c_

per·iod.

It is quite futiJe to atte~pt such probing aro~nd in

10

the quag1nL1·c of tr:e t pe:riod>r:-spe:ci2lly s11;ce it . .,~::is a

r~, n~or

part of the p:r·of e ssi on to o bf1.1 sea te everything c;n d ev c:1·y.·:J-i e;r e

a s a matter of expert ise.

Men

~ho

might truthfully

s ~ear

that

they took part in such end such a mission would be wrong becau s e they would have no v:ay of knm·:ing that the part of the
mission they worked with was only the umbrella portion and
t}:at t!1e me n they trained and l aunche d n e v e r were intended t o
go c.n;y-•. here anyhow.
1

.

Even some who ser\red with military ·uni ts never knew t!:at

tht:-l.\"' ·...mi ts

\·,iere really false ani they v:ere s: v.pl;y rr.aintaining

helicopters or keeping records for the CIA.
But there is a ....:ay to get to a full un8erstanCiing of
_,_ ,

al.l of L·_c;ese

fine detail

?he
t~e

this country spells out in

duties and responsibilities of the CIA.

that is necessary is to ask the CIA

~hat

it has done in

All
accorda~ce

with the law--a law ~hich i fu ~lti~ately unco~plicated
i~ e:aC. s

it with skill .::nd ca:re.

_;.nd next it is sir:rnle to ar.:'ange

v:itn the CIA that it wi ll be funded explicitfy each -.i ec r-

ce~t2 in
2nd tha t

thin gs of importance
t~ere

4 c~this government

and its

.

GO

'
c.o

~elf~re

will be Boney for those th i ngs and nothing else.

'l'!::e.t is the i·:ay these th ini; s

can be operated.

·. .'E did thet in

the :':!OD ior t b ose nine ;years a...'Tld we }r,._new \.;hat we.s goi::1g on.

',: e c;te a little c:r-o·. -.' f:r·oo ti::De t.o ti=ie; but e. t lea
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